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Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court’s Intervention as Neo-colonial: 





The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) intervention in Kenya’s 2007/2008 political crisis was 
reframed as neo-colonialism by two of the accused – Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto – and 
their allies for most of their pre-trial and trial timelines. This article examines the grounds for 
and impacts of the neo-colonial narrative, which was central to the accused overcoming their 
ICC stigma. Shamed by the ICC’s indictments, Kenyatta, Ruto and their allies formed the 
Jubilee Alliance, whose neo-colonial narrative dominated national and regional discourses on 
Africa–ICC relations. This article’s discussion of the ICC’s counter-shaming in Kenya supports 
previous analyses that demonstrate how international criminal justice (ICJ) is undermined in 
local spaces. The article contrasts Kenya’s and Sudan’s experiences, highlighting the salience 
of the former’s neo-colonial narrative in departing from cooperation as opposed to Sudan’s 
outright defiance after Omar al-Bashir’s indictment. The article suggests a need for more 
sophisticated comparative analysis of various country strategies. It specifically posits that for 
the Jubilee Alliance, the neo-colonial narrative was salient in the Alliance’s struggle against 
cooperation due to the narrative’s multiple intentions and outcomes: persuading targeted local 
constituencies while delegitimizing the ICC; gaining concessions from some ICC 
sympathizers; and courting regional solidarity in battling the ICC. Given the Kenyan 
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experience, the ICC and its supporters need to be aware of different ways in which local actors 
can manoeuvre the Court’s moral authority and normative imperative.  
 




There are emerging debates on the impacts of the International Criminal Court (ICC) since its 
creation in 2002. Carsten Stahn uses André Gide’s rendition of the parable of the prodigal son 
to question the standards under which we should assess international criminal justice (ICJ).1 
Stahn argues that ‘the legacies of international tribunals develop on external judgements and 
incrementally over time, rather than something that can be unilaterally construed or created.’2 
Hence, despite its normative imperative as a court of last resort and its moral authority,3 there 
are emerging narratives – such as neo-colonialism – on the ICC’s interventions in Africa, the 
geographical location of most of the ICC’s active situations. 
Although some African leaders and groups portray the ICC’s forays on the continent 
as attempts to foster neo-colonialism,4 others contest this framing. For example, human rights 
activists across the continent challenge this notion and instead call on African governments to 
                                                          
1 Carsten Stahn, ‘Editorial: Between “Faith” and “Facts”: By What Standards Should We Assess 
International Criminal Justice?’ Leiden Journal of International Law 25(2) (2012): 251–282; André Gide, 
The Return of the Prodigal Son, trans. Aldyth Thain (Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, 1960).  
2 Stahn, supra n 1 at 275. 
3 This derives from the ICC’s demonstration of its ability/willingness to try heinous crimes in cases of 
domestic inaction and its lack of tolerance for impunity for such crimes. It also spans geographical 
boundaries, with membership from over 124 states across the world’s regions.   
4 Many African heads of state have articulated these positions in AU sessions. For instance, 
Hailemariam Desalegn, former AU chairman and Ethiopia’s prime minister, lamented that the ‘ICC 
process had degenerated into some kind of race hunting.’ See, ‘ICC Targets Africans on Race Basis: 
African Union Chair,’ Daily Nation, 27 May 2013. Some African scholars, observers and citizens 
contend that the ICC unfairly targets Africa, as serious crimes in other regions do not attract close 
scrutiny. See, W. Douglas Smith, ‘The International Criminal Court: The Long Arm of Neo-
colonialism?’ International Affairs Review (2009), http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/87 (accessed 24 
November 2016). 
support the Court.5 Sulemana Braima argues that the limitations of national judicial 
mechanisms in Africa render ICJ mechanisms appropriate solutions for seeking justice for 
victims and for holding perpetrators accountable.6 Similarly, some states, such as Botswana, 
consistently differ from their African counterparts and voice support for the ICC.7  
Nonetheless, the neo-colonial narrative is indicative of external judgements over time 
on the Court’s record as well as on the interface between ICJ and national/regional contexts. 
The narrative was first applied to the UN Security Council (UNSC)8 referrals in Sudan and 
Libya, resulting in national and regional offensives against the Court.9 As Phil Clark states, 
‘Sudan’s President, Omar al Bashir, regularly accused the ICC of neo-colonialist meddling to 
bolster his domestic political support.’10 For its part, the Africa Union (AU) pressed the UNSC 
to defer al-Bashir’s case, expressing  
its deep concern at the indictment…and cautions that, in view of the delicate 
nature of the peace processes underway in Sudan, approval of this application 
would seriously undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the early 
resolution of the conflict in Darfur.11   
However, the narrative gained unprecedented momentum in the region with the ICC’s 
involvement in Kenya’s 2007/2008 post-election violence (PEV). For most of the duration of 
the cases against Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto,12 the Jubilee Alliance13 used various 
                                                          
5 Human Rights Watch, ‘AU: Activists Challenge Attacks on ICC,’ 6 July 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/06/au-activists-challenge-attacks-icc (accessed 24 November 
2016). 
6 Sulemana Braima, ‘What AU Leaders Should Reflect on before Any Further Actions on ICC,’ in 
Reflections on the African Union ICC Relationship (Nairobi: African Network on International Criminal 
Justice, 2014). 
7 ‘Botswana Calls on International Community to Respect ICC,’ ENCA, 2 October 2015. 
8 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute provides for a UNSC referral. 
9 State referral situations (as in Uganda, Central African Republic [CAR], Democratic Republic of the 
Congo [DRC] and Mali) did not appeal to the narrative. 
10 Phil Clark, ‘The ICC Is Only a Small Piece in the Justice Puzzle of Africa’s Conflicts,’ East African, 11 
April 2011.   
11 ‘Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment 
of the President of the Republic of The Sudan,’ Decision No. Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII) (February 
2009), 1. 
12 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11; The Prosecutor v. William Samoei 
Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11. 
13 Kenyatta, Ruto and their allies formed the Jubilee Alliance as a political coalition between 
Kenyatta’s party, The National Alliance (TNA), and Ruto’s United Republican Party (URP). 
national platforms – including anti-ICC prayer rallies,14 local vernacular radio stations, national 
TV talk shows and newspaper opinions15 – to attack the ICC as a neo-colonial institution. 
Additionally, it framed the 2013 elections as a referendum on the ICC and its attendant neo-
colonialism.16 The Alliance subsequently won the elections, after which the neo-colonial 
narrative promoted by Kenya dominated regional discourses on Africa–ICC relationships.  
Thus, in subsequent AU sessions, the ICC’s mission on the continent was questioned.17 
There were demands for Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s cases to be deferred or terminated and 
renewed calls for al-Bashir’s case to be deferred.18 The AU also contemplated regional 
alternatives to the ICC19 or even mass African withdrawal from the Court.20 Luke Moffett states 
that  
the AU doubled its moves in 2011 at the start of the ICC cases against Kenyatta 
and Ruto…this was only compounded by Kenya’s claims that the ICC was being 
neo-colonial and targeting Africans.21   
Similarly, Terence McNamee opines that ‘the controversies raised by the Court’s focus 
on Africa have been significantly amplified by the recent prosecutions of Kenya’s President 
and Deputy President.’22  
                                                          
14 John Ngirachu and Oliver Musembi, ‘Uhuru, Ruto Hold Last Rally Ahead of Hague Visit,’ Daily Nation, 
4 April 2011. 
15 Peter Kagwanja, ‘ICC the Greatest Threat to Ideals of 2010 Constitution,’ Daily Nation, 29 August 
2015. 
16 See, ‘Did the ICC Help Uhuru Kenyatta Win Kenyan Election?’ BBC, 11 March 2013.  
17 For instance, most African leaders agreed with Kenya’s neo-colonial labelling of the ICC and 
endorsed non-cooperation with the Court based on the Kenyan cases. 
18 ‘Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC),’ AU Doc. 
EX.CL/639(XVIII), Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI).  
19 Although there had been talks of expanding the protocol of the African Court of Human and People’s 
Rights (AfCHPR) to include international crimes, these efforts were rejuvenated with the onset of the 
Kenyan cases. For example, while condemning the ICC’s prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto, the AU 
arrived at several decisions, including ‘To fast track the process of expanding the mandate of the 
AfCHPR to try international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.’ See, 
‘Decision on Africa’s relationship with the International Criminal Court 
(ICC),’Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(Oct.2013), 2. 
20 Walter Menya, ‘African States Threaten to Leave ICC,’ Daily Nation, 10 April 2011. 
21 Luke Moffett, ‘Al-Bashir’s Escape: Why the African Union Defies the ICC,’ Conversation, 15 June 
2015. 
22 Terence McNamee, ‘The ICC and Africa: Between Aspiration and Reality: Making International 
Justice Work Better for Africa,’ 
http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commisioned_Reports/Brenthurst-paper-
201402-ICC-and-Africa.pdf (accessed 24 November 2016), 4.  
This article’s arguments on counter-shaming the ICC in Kenya build on Victor Peskin’s 
conceptualization of international trials as ‘virtual trials’ or ‘trials of cooperation’ to show how 
international criminal tribunals  struggle for cooperation with state authorities.23 As Peskin 
argues, ‘The idea of a “trial of cooperation”…helps illuminate the features of the power 
struggles beyond the courtroom...that pits the tribunal against the state and state leaders.’24 
Significantly, given the lack of executive power and a police force of its own, the ICC is limited 
to relying on shaming and soft power to persuade states to cooperate, which opens the space 
for trials of cooperation. 
In a keynote address at Salzburg Law School on International Criminal Law in 2011, 
former ICC judge Hans-Peter Kaul cited the ICC’s reliance on state cooperation as one of the 
main challenges facing the Court.25 Similarly, Hyun Song, a former ICC president, reiterated 
that cooperation is among the Court’s main challenges.26 According to an ICC official,  
since the court depends on mature state responsibility, there is little the court can 
do if leaders orchestrate non-cooperation and there is an absence of UN 
pressure…The ICC depends on states living to their international 
responsibilities...an equivalence of expecting politicians to prioritize the rule of law 
as opposed to their interests.27 
Of course, as elsewhere, the affected Kenyan political elites prioritized their interests 
vis-à-vis the ICC’s mission in their local spaces, resulting in their struggles for and against 
cooperation. This article supports previous analyses that demonstrate how ICJ can be 
                                                          
23 Victor Peskin, ‘Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s Pursuit of 
Accountability in Uganda and Sudan,’ Human Rights Quarterly 31(3) (2009): 660. 
24 Ibid. 
25 International Criminal Court, ‘The International Criminal Court: Current Challenges and Perspectives,’ 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a854-
3b7d0a4b9f06/283740/010911salzburglawschool.pdf (accessed 24 November 2016). 
26 International Criminal Court, ‘Promoting Accountability for Human Rights Violations: Forging Effective 
and Efficient Litigation of International Atrocity Crimes,’ 10 December 2014, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/presidency/141210-President-Human-Rights-Accountability.pdf (accessed 24 
November 2016).  
27 Personal interview, ICC official, The Hague, The Netherlands, 22 July 2015.  
undermined in local spaces,28 but at the same time shows how this can be done more subtly 
than was the case in Sudan, with different effects. I contrast Kenya, the ICC’s first proprio 
motu situation,29 and Sudan, the first UNSC referral, as they demonstrate the struggles for 
and against cooperation. I discuss Kenya’s neo-colonial narrative, which appealed to local and 
regional constituencies, in departing from cooperation, as well as Sudan’s outright defiance 
after al-Bashir’s indictment, and posit the need for more sophisticated comparative analyses 
of various country strategies in undermining ICJ. 
Specifically, I argue that for the Jubilee Alliance, the neo-colonial narrative was salient 
in the Alliance’s struggle against cooperation given the narrative’s multiple intentions and 
outcomes: persuading targeted local constituencies while delegitimizing the ICC, gaining 
concessions from some of the Court’s sympathizers and courting regional solidarity in battling 
the ICC. The narrative was instrumental in overcoming some of the obstacles associated with 
Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s ICC stigma, their quest for the country’s leadership and their dealings 
with the Court thereafter. The obstacles included local contestations over ICJ and competing 
conflict narratives between Kenyatta’s Kikuyu and Ruto’s Kalenjin communities.30     
Although considerable attention has been given in the literature to the success of the 
Jubilee Alliance in the 2013 elections,31 it doesn’t explain how the accused overcame their 
ICC stigma and other obstacles. This article therefore offers novel insights into how the Jubilee 
Alliance counter-shamed the Court’s intervention as neo-colonial, and provides a more 
nuanced analysis of the struggle against cooperation in Kenya.  
                                                          
28 Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2009); Victor Peskin, International justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual trials and the 
struggle for state cooperation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
29 The ICC’s ability to initiate its own investigation, enshrined in arts. 13(c), 15 and 53(1) of the Rome 
Statute. 
30 The Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities have dominated Kenyan politics since independence. They 
are two of the largest voting blocs and fought in the elections violence of 1992, 1997 and 2007.  
31 Gabrielle Lynch, ‘Electing the “Alliance of the Accused”: The Success of the Jubilee Alliance in 
Kenya’s Rift Valley,’ Journal of Eastern African Studies 8(1) (2014): 93–114; Thomas P. Wolf, ‘From 
Sinners to Saints? The ICC and Jubilee’s Triumph in Kenya’s 2013 Election’ and Joyce Nyairo, ‘The 
Circus Comes to Town: Performance, Religion and Exchange in Political Party Campaigns,’ in Kenya’s 
2013 General Election: Stakes, Practices and Outcomes, ed. Peter Wafula Wekesa and Kimani Njogu 
(Nairobi: Twaweza Communications and Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2015); Susanne D. Mueller, ‘Kenya and 
the International Criminal Court (ICC): Politics, the Election and the Law,’ Journal of Eastern African 
Studies 8(1) (2014): 25–42. 
The arguments in this article build upon fieldwork conducted between July 2015 and 
May 2016 in The Netherlands, Kenya and Uganda.32 I conducted over 80 key informant 
interviews with officials from the ICC and international nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), political elites, civil society activists, journalists, religious leaders and government 
officials. Interviewees were promised anonymity due to the sensitivity of discussions on the 
ICC in Kenya. In addition, I evaluated secondary literature, government and nongovernment 
reports as well as media reports. The primary data collected were analyzed, themes drawn as 
they emerged and then triangulated with additional secondary data.   
In the remainder of this article I start by briefly discussing Kenya’s ethnic divisions, 
recourse to violence and the ICC’s interventions as critical contexts. I then look at the shaming 
of alleged perpetrators of the 2007 PEV with ICC indictments, highlighting the stigma the 
accused faced. After exploring the challenges the accused faced in their political ambitions 
from some of their supporters, western diplomats, civil society and their political opponents, I 
turn to the Jubilee Alliance’s struggle for and against cooperation with the ICC. Contrary to 
expectations that they would skip trials, the accused attended the Court’s summonses even 
after their election into government. Besides, they sought the UNSC’s deferral and challenged 
their cases through legal submissions at the ICC. Thereafter, I discuss their struggle against 
cooperation, using the neo-colonial narrative. Specifically, I discuss the narrative’s multiple 
intentions and impacts nationally and regionally, including managing norm contestations over 
ICJ and delegitimizing the court’s moral authority. I conclude by questioning the implications 
of counter-shaming ICJ.  
 
<A>KENYA’S POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE 2007/2008 VIOLATIONS  
The modern Kenyan state owes its creation to British colonialism, under which different ethnic 
communities were united to form a nation state. Established in the absence of a social 
                                                          
32 The arguments in this article obtain from a larger PhD project, ‘Politicization of International Criminal 
Intervention: A Comparative Study of Uganda and Kenya,’ for which interviews were conducted in the 
three countries.  
contract, the colonial administration was brutal and indigenous African communities were 
subjected to discrimination in social, political and economic spheres. Under colonialism, 
Africans were confined to hard labour, highly taxed and denied free movement and political 
representation.33 As a result, several ethnic communities resisted colonial rule although some 
collaborated with the British.   
Towards the second half of the 20th century, Kenyan nationalists formed trade 
movements and political parties and jointly fought for independence. Despite efforts at 
democratic consolidation in the post-independent state, ethnic fissures persisted in Kenya as 
observed in political mobilization, distribution of economic resources, cultural and linguistic 
differences as well as in geographic locations.34  
Evidence of Kenya’s deep ethnic divisions was evident in the 1992, 1997 and 2007 
general elections, where perceived ethnic opponents were targeted. Some were killed and 
others displaced or their property destroyed.35 Antagonistic communities rationalized war 
against others as being justified since they were enemy nations fighting for control of political 
power and economic resources.36    
The 2007/2008 PEV marked the worst incidents of human rights violations in post- 
independent Kenya. Violence ensued after the disputed presidential election results between 
the Party of National Unity (PNU) led by Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) under the leadership of Raila Odinga. As the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV) reveals,37 the violence followed ethno-regional patterns of party affiliations, 
                                                          
33 Francesca Bates, ‘British Rule in Kenya,’ Washington State University, 19 January 2015, 
https://history105.libraries.wsu.edu/spring2015/2015/01/19/british-rule-in-kenya/ (accessed 23 
November 2016). 
34 In the post-independence order, administrative units consisted of provinces and districts which were 
occupied by distinct tribes. The 2010 constitution reorganized Kenya’s governance structure into 47 
counties and sub counties, all with distinct ethnic nationalities (although there are some cosmopolitan 
locations). 
35 The 2007 PEV was widespread – it was experienced in the slums of Nairobi, parts of Western, 
Nyanza, Coast and Rift Valley. The 1992 and 1997 PEVs were localized in the Rift Valley and some 
parts of the Coast. 
36 See, Sarah Ann Jenkins, ‘Understanding Ethnic Violence: The 2007–2008 Post-Election Crisis in 
Kenya’ (PhD thesis, Aberystwyth University, Wales, 2012).  
37 For an account of the PEV, see, ‘Kenya: Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV) Final Report,’ 
with official figures indicating the death of approximately 1,300 civilians and the displacement 
of about 663,921 people.38  
As Elisabeth Lindenmayer and Josie Kaye reveal, the magnitude of the atrocities 
indicated that Kenya’s governance crisis needed the world’s attention.39 As a result, the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) team, with the assistance of the AU and 
international actors, negotiated a power-sharing transitional PNU/ODM government. This 
government earmarked a raft of measures – including institutional reforms, lustration, truth 
telling and criminal accountability for the PEV – to confront Kenya’s past and to address the 
root causes of the violence.40 
On criminal accountability, CIPEV recommended the creation of a special tribunal 
within 60 days, failing which the ICC’s jurisdiction would be triggered. However, as Godfrey 
Musila notes, ‘The transitional government lacked a unified stand on accountability for PEV, 
and wavered on its position on the special tribunal.’41 Furthermore, efforts to establish the 
tribunal were thwarted in the National Assembly by Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s allies, with the 
slogan ‘Don’t be vague go to The Hague.’42  
Thus, with the lapse of the deadline due to domestic inaction, the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) issued summonses for six individuals to appear: Kenyatta (deputy prime 
minister and minister for finance), Francis Muthaura (head of civil service), Mohammed 
                                                          
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15A00F569813F4D549257607001F459D-
Full_Report.pdf (accessed 24 November 2016). 
38 Gabrielle Lynch, ‘Durable Solution, Help or Hindrance? The Failings and Unintended Implications of 
Relief and Recovery Efforts for Kenya’s Post-Election IDPs,’ Review of African Political Economy 
36(122) (2009): 604–610.  
39 Elisabeth Lindenmayer and Josie Lianna Kaye, A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of 
Mediation in Kenya (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009). 




term%20Issues%20and%20Solutions.pdf (accessed 24 November 2016). 
41 Godfrey Musila, ‘Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of External 
Prescriptions,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 3(3) 2009: 450. 
42 The MPs were apprehensive that the special tribunal would become a reality, thus preferring a distant 
ICC that was less active at the time. See, Stephen Brown and Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘The Big Fish 
Won’t Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya,’ African Affairs 
111(443) (2012): 244–260. 
Hussein Ali (police commissioner), Ruto (minister for education), Henry Kosgey (minister for 
industrialization) and radio journalist Joshua arap Sang. The six suspects became popularly 
known as the ‘Ocampo six’ after their indictment by the then ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno 
Ocampo. The Hague Trials, a website dedicated to monitoring Kenya’s ICC trials, reveals that 
Ocampo’s 15 December 2010 announcement of the list of six suspects ‘shook Kenya to its 
core.’43 
 
<A>SHAMING THE ‘OCAMPO SIX’  
The 2007 PEV was catastrophic and almost submerged the nation in civil strife. Warring 
communities’ reasons for the violence were based on their specific interests and 
circumstances. For example, the Kalenjin explained the violence perpetrated against Kikuyu 
communities as revenge for encroaching on their ancestral land in the Rift Valley.44 The 
Kikuyu, on the other hand, explained that retaliatory attacks helped stop the violence and were 
justified as they had been provoked.45 For the Luo, their violence was spontaneous because 
they were contesting stolen presidential election results.46  
However, the ICC’s indictment of suspects added a rider to the local conflict narratives 
– international crimes were committed and had to be punished under international law. Thus, 
the ICC’s intervention challenged the rationalization of the violence within local contexts. 
Moreover, being accused of committing the worst crimes against humanity was horrific and 
came with a stigma for the suspects. Kenyatta speaks of his lowest ICC moments thus: ‘I felt 
it was better to stop what I was doing at the time and go and watch television…it is part of life, 
                                                          
43 The Hague Trials, ‘ICC Prosecutor Names the “Ocampo Six”,’ 15 December 2010, 
https://thehaguetrials.co.ke/timeline/icc-prosecutor-names-ocampo-six (accessed 2 July 2016).  
44 Nearly all Kalenjin interviewees articulated this position.  
45 Nearly all Kikuyu interviewees advanced this argument.  
46 See the CIPEV report, supra n 37.  
there will be challenges.’47 For Sang, the Ocampo Six list ‘turned his world upside down and 
was terrifying.’48 According to Kosgey,  
The ICC nightmare was traumatising and difficult…because of the magnitude of 
the charges, the reaction of Kenyans and how to explain the turn of events to his 
family.49  
Speaking of his ‘ICC nightmare,’50 Muthaura recalled how ‘the career-threatening 
charges, which saw him quit his job as head of the civil service, caused him and close family 
members a lot of pain,’51 and Hussein Ali ‘wishes no one ICC pain.’52 Overall, Kenyatta ‘cannot 
narrate quite accurately the calculated humiliation and stigma the prosecution has inflicted on 
[them] at every turn, within and outside the proceedings.’53  
However, the ICC’s intervention was at odds with dominant local attitudes around how 
these events were interpreted and managed, as espoused in phrases such as ‘forgetting’ and 
‘moving on.’54 After the 1992 and 1997 PEV, Kenyans ‘forgot’ and ‘moved on’ after domestic 
inaction on the human rights violations. The entry of ICJ into the domestic realm in the post-
2007/2008 events therefore defined a fundamental departure from the past. According to 
Ndun’gu Wainaina, a prominent human rights activist, the ICC changed the equation of 
political crimes enterprise by expanding the avenues for accountability.55  
Shamed by the ICC’s indictment, Kenyatta, Ruto, Kosgey and Muthaura resigned from 
their cabinet positions on the grounds of integrity. However, Kenyatta resigned only from his 
position as finance minister and not as deputy prime minister.56 Sang resigned from his KASS 
FM station because ‘it was very painful to broadcast internationally as an ICC suspect and co-
                                                          
47 Paul Ilado, ‘President Uhuru Speaks of His Lowest ICC Moment: When the News Broke’, Star, 18 
June 2016.  
48 Cate Mukei, ‘The “Ocampo Six” List Turned My Life Upside down – Joshua Arap Sang,’ Standard, 
10 June 2016.  
49 Emeka Mayaka Gekara, ‘Kosgey: My ICC Nightmare,’ Daily Nation, 4 August 2012.  
50 Isaack Ongiri, ‘Muthaura Speaks out on His ICC “Nightmare”,’ Daily Nation, 13 March 2013.  
51 Ibid. 
52 John Ngirachu, ‘I Wish No One ICC Pain, Says Ali,’ Daily Nation, 25 January 2012.  
53 ‘President Uhuru Hits out at the West over ICC,’ Daily Nation, 12 October 2013.  
54 These phrases are popular in Kenya, indicating that people are used to impunity. 
55 Personal interview, Ndun’gu Wainaina, Nairobi, Kenya, 8 October 2015.  
56 ‘Uhuru: I Will Not Quit as Deputy PM,’ Daily Nation, 28 January 2012.  
workers would be uncomfortable.’57 The KNDR monitoring survey58 revealed that ‘Kenyans 
are generally supportive of prosecution – including by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – 
of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the post-election violence.’59 Specifically, the 
national average in support stood at 57 percent, with Central (Kikuyu) recording 55 percent, 
Nairobi (cosmopolitan) 75 percent, Kisumu (Luo) 46 percent, Eldoret (Kalenjin) 48 percent and 
victims 75 percent.60  
With Kenyans’ support for prosecutions and the shame accompanying the ICC charges 
of committing crimes against humanity, Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s 2013 presidential ambitions 
faced challenges from many quarters. Furthermore, given that the outgoing president, Mwai 
Kibaki, was a Kikuyu, the idea of another Kikuyu president was problematic for many as this 
reinforced the Kikuyu’s political supremacy in Kenya’s multi-ethnic society. There were public 
discussions around the probability of sanctions and Kenya’s isolation if Kenyatta and Ruto 
succeeded, as well as the possibilities of imprisonment during their terms in office and whether 
they would step down if convicted. As a result, Uhuruto (as Kenyatta and Ruto became 
popularly known) considered options for a compromise candidate, Musalia Mudavadi.61  
Moreover, the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin (Uhuruto’s support bases) had competing 
narratives about the 2007 violations. The two communities were in opposing camps in the 
2007 conflict, and their leaders were accused of committing crimes against each other’s 
supporters. According to the Kalenjins, the violence was spontaneous.62 They accused the 
Kikuyu of settling on their land, thus justifying targeting them in the PEV. For instance, a 
Kalenjin youth talked of the Kikuyu as ‘unstoppable and almost becoming exploitative.’63 
Conversely, the Kikuyu community had experienced attacks and displacements in the Rift 
                                                          
57 Mukei, supra n 48.  
58 The KNDR mandated South Consulting to monitor Kenya’s reform process.  
59 South Consulting, ‘The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project: 
Review Report for October–December 2009,’ January 2010, 
http://south.co.ke/images/south/KNDR_Reports/5threviewreport.pdf (accessed 23 November 2016), vi.  
60 Ibid.42 
61 Mosoku Geoffrey, ‘Leaders Prop Mudavadi as Compromise Candidate,’ Standard, 6 December 2012.  
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Valley in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2005 and again in 2007.64 They lost land, property and community 
members, and hence felt that their leaders could not be blamed for retaliatory attacks. For the 
Kikuyu, justice was necessary. As a Kikuyu politician observes, ‘Although people had different 
opinions, pro-ICC people thought Kenyan courts would not deliver justice to victims.’65 
Furthermore, some Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters were also confronted with the difficulty 
of whether or not to vote for ICC suspects. Dominic Burbidge notes that ‘a key area of tension 
for middle class Kikuyu voters was the dilemma of voting in Kenyatta and Ruto while their 
status as suspects at the ICC remained unresolved.’66 Similarly, Donald Kipkorir, a prominent 
Kalenjin lawyer, argued that ‘Uhuru and Ruto should not lure Kenyans to tempt the gods...their 
participation [in the election] will imperil our path to prosperity and realisation of our Vision 
2030.’67 Kipkorir continued,  
For sure, we will be a pariah state and Kenya will be reduced to trading and having 
relationships with Eritrea, Sudan, North Korea, Zimbabwe and Syria only. Is this a 
path that Uhuru and Ruto want us to walk?  
For the Jubilee Alliance’s main rivals in the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy 
(CORD), the two were unelectable given their ICC cases.68 CORD’s presidential candidate, 
Raila Odinga, called on the suspects on numerous occasions to first clear their names before 
running for elections. Further, in a televised presidential debate in February 2013, Odinga 
chided Kenyatta’s presidential bid, stating that ‘it would pose a challenge to run a government 
via Skype from The Hague.’69 For their part, civil society stakeholders filed a court petition 
(which was dismissed) challenging Uhuruto’s eligibility to run for elections based on integrity 
clauses in Chapter 6 of the new constitution. For western diplomats, Kenyans’ ‘choices had 
                                                          
64 Nearly all Kikuyu interviewees articulated this. 
65 Personal interview, Kikuyu politician, Nairobi, Kenya, 29 September 2015.   
66 Dominic Burbidge, ‘“Can Someone Get Me Outta This Middle-Class Zone?!” Pressures on Middle 
Class Kikuyu in Kenya’s 2013 Election,’ Journal of Modern African Studies 52(2) (2014): 218. 
67 Donald Kipkorir, ‘Uhuru and Ruto Should Not Lure Kenyans to Tempt the Gods,’ Standard, 4 
November 2012.   
68 Personal interview, CORD official, Nairobi, Kenya, 1 October 2015. 
69 Clar Ni Chonghaile, ‘Kenya Tunes in as Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga Promise Peaceful 
Elections,’ Guardian, 11 February 2013. 
consequences,’ as the US assistant secretary of state asserted in a telephone conversation 
with journalists,70 and, according to a UK diplomat in Eldoret, there would be ‘minimum 
contacts with ICC suspects should they win elections.’71 
Scholars also weighed in on Uhuruto’s momentous task in seeking elective offices 
despite their ICC predicaments. This was captured in phrases such as Gabrielle Lynch’s 
‘electing the “alliance of the accused”,’72 Tom Wolf’s ‘from sinners to saints’73 and Susan 
Mueller’s depiction of Kenya as an ‘outlier’ for electing the ICC accused.74 
Despite their ‘outlier’ status, Kenya’s accused did not opt for outright rejection of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, as Sudan’s al-Bashir and his allies did after their indictments. Instead, 
Kenyatta, Ruto and the rest of the ‘Ocampo Six’ obeyed Court summonses. Nonetheless, the 
two power elites also employed strategies against cooperation, including publicly condemning 
the ICC as a neo-colonial institution, attempting to withdraw Kenya from the Rome Statute and 
fighting human rights activists who supported the Court. The OTP described the Kenyan cases 
as  
Fraught with cooperation challenges and obstacles relating to the security of 
witnesses. Many victims and witnesses have been too scared to come forward, 
others have…sought to withdraw from the process, citing intimidation or fear of 
harm. Worrying evidence has also emerged of attempts to bribe witnesses to 
withdraw or recant their evidence.75                             
Sudan similarly accused the ICC of neo-colonialism while at the same time cooperating 
by allowing the ICC to establish an office in the country. Sudan also established its own Special 
Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur in order to prevent the ICC’s intervention under the 
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complementarity regime,76 and signed a cooperation agreement on the Lord’s Resistance 
Army case.77 Nonetheless, Sudan’s cooperation stopped almost two years after the UNSC 
referral when the OTP issued summonses for Sudanese suspects to appear. Relations waned 
significantly when the ICC issued arrest warrants for al-Bashir in March 2009, after which 
Sudan ‘unsigned’ from the Rome Statute.78 
Thus, for Sudan, al-Bashir’s rejection of the ICC’s jurisdiction considerably affected the 
progress of the cases. Consequently, the OTP cited the challenges as ‘lack of access to the 
territory of Sudan; resource constraints and non-execution of the long outstanding arrest 
warrants that have all contributed to the slow progress in investigations.’79 Conversely, for 
Kenya, the cases progressed as the Jubilee Alliance opted to comply with some of the ICC’s 
obligations while departing from this compliance in equal measure.  
 
<A>THE JUBILEE ALLIANCE’S STRUGGLE FOR AND AGAINST COOPERATION  
The Jubilee Alliance employed a calculated mix of both cooperation and non-cooperation, 
centred on balancing their commitment risks and their noncompliance risks: apprehensions 
around the reach of ICJ, and appreciation of international norms.   
Given that non-compliance with the Court’s summonses would damage personal 
reputations and portray the suspects as fugitives of justice and averse to international norms, 
Kenyatta and Ruto cooperated with the ICC, contrary to speculations that they would skip pre-
trial briefings and subsequent trials.80 Although they were later elected as president and 
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deputy president, respectively, Kenyatta and Ruto complied with the Court’s summonses 
despite calls for defiance from their supporters81 and AU resolutions on non-cooperation.82 
Peter Kagwanja, a former senior government adviser, notes that Kenyatta pursued the 
compliance strategy even after his election, despite the options of al-Bashir’s open defiance 
strategy and withdrawing Kenya from the ICC.83 According to Kagwanja, defiance  
would have triggered an automatic warrant of arrest and possible sanctions 
against the country…Kenyatta’s hobbling as a fugitive president and Kenya would 
have almost certainly joined Zimbabwe in the West’s list of ‘rogue’ states.84   
For Kenyatta, the continued cooperation even after forming the government was ‘the 
only means to achieve personal vindication and also to protect our country from prejudice.’85 
A senior official in the Jubilee administration notes, ‘They won elections and also cooperated 
with the Court…people thought it would be a crazy state, and that immediately after 
inauguration the government would repeal law.’86   
As the possibility of convictions was feasible, Kenyatta and Ruto were also active agents 
in circumventing justice, which included seeking political power to shield them from the ICC. 
A Kalenjin interviewee from the Rift Valley, from where Ruto hails, notes, ‘Their strategy was 
to get into government and use it to get their people out of the ICC.’87 Similarly, some Jubilee 
Alliance members of parliament (MPs) opined that ‘the state tends to act with zeal to protect 
heads of state from international justice.’88  
Several events outside the courtroom amounted to non-cooperation despite the 
accuseds’ compliance with the Court summons. First, the OTP complained about witness 
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intimidation and interference, non-cooperation in turning over crucial evidence and 
politicization of the Kenyan cases. For example, in one of her statements on Kenya’s 
cooperation, Fatou Bensouda decried Kenya’s failure to cooperate and identified some of the 
challenges her office faced:  
A steady and relentless stream of false media reports about the Kenya cases; an 
unprecedented campaign on social media to expose the identity of protected 
witnesses…; concerted and wide-ranging efforts to harass, intimidate and threaten 
individuals who would wish to be witnesses.89  
Second, running parallel to the trials, Kenyatta, Ruto and their allies in the PNU wing of 
the coalition government attempted several options for case termination, some of which were 
within the Rome system of justice. Uhuruto’s allies in the National Assembly passed a motion 
in parliament seeking to repeal the International Crimes Act.90 Since their action had no 
bearing on ongoing cases, their PNU allies sought deferral from the UNSC under Article 16. 
The UNSC rejected the request and advised on challenges to admissibility under Article 19,91 
which they did in March 2011.92 Pre-trial Chamber II dismissed the admissibility case,93 which 
was appealed. The appeal was dismissed as well, in June 2011.94  
Third, in public vituperations, the Court’s intervention was reframed as neo-colonialism, 
a performance of injustice and an affront to Kenya’s sovereignty.95 For example, in one of the 
many anti-ICC prayer rallies, more than 50 Jubilee Alliance MPs declared the Court an enemy 
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of the Kenyan people, claiming that it worked to destabilize the country.96 Moreover, some 
MPs claimed that the ICC charges were fixed and based on a witch hunt and on compromised 
witnesses.97 Furthermore, Uhuruto declared the end of Kenya’s cooperation with the Court98 
and renewed calls for ICC withdrawal99 after the collapse of the Kenyan cases. The Jubilee 
administration also fought prominent human rights activists who were seen to be supportive 
of ICJ. Notable was the idea of an ‘evil’ civil society in the run-up to the election and threats to 
change laws regulating the funding of civil society organizations (CSOs) after the election.100  
Despite these affronts against the ICC, I argue that the neo-colonial narrative was salient 
in the Alliance’s struggle against cooperation due to its multiple intentions and impacts in local 
and regional contexts. It exploited local and regional historical and political contexts, thus 
gaining prominence in national and regional discourses on Africa–ICC relations and Africa’s 
place in the global political economy. Moreover, the narrative set the Court up against 
collective communal and regional interests. Other forms of non-cooperation (witness 
intimidation and interference, seeking withdrawal from the ICC, not turning in crucial evidence, 
false media reports) were more localized and thus less prominent.  
 
<A>THE NEOCOLONIAL NARRATIVE: INTENTIONS AND IMPACTS   
Besides Uhuruto’s struggle for and against cooperation, they also faced domestic normative 
contestation over the ICC’s discourse. Notably, their rivals in CORD expressed support for the 
ICC trials and rejected the Alliance’s legal manoeuvres to terminate the cases and withdraw 
from the ICC.101 Moreover, civil society activists were consistently engaged in national and 
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international advocacy in which they challenged the Jubilee Alliance’s narratives on 
cooperation.102 Additionally, western diplomats expressed their support for the ICC as a policy 
position from their home countries.103  
Despite their ICC tribulations, Kenyatta and Ruto won the elections. Although many 
question the credibility of the results,104 Lynch argues that it was clear that ‘the majority of 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin voted for the Jubilee Alliance and were happy with the results.’105 More 
importantly, they had a clear majority in the National Assembly and a slim majority in the 
senate.  
A discussion of the intentions and impacts of the neo-colonial narrative accounts for 
how the Jubilee Alliance ‘knocked off the ICC from its moral pedestal.’106 I argue that the neo-
colonial narrative was central in appealing to targeted local and regional constituencies while 
alienating the Court’s sympathizers from Uhuruto’s support base. As a result, the narrative 
achieved multiple outcomes: persuading targeted local constituencies while delegitimizing the 
ICC, gaining concessions from some of the Court’s sympathizers and courting regional 
solidarity in battling the ICC.   
 
<B>Persuading Targeted Constituencies and Delegitimizing the ICC 
As a Kikuyu politician noted, ‘The 2013 elections campaign was not about who was going to 
do a good job, but [about] preventing Uhuru from going to The Hague…The election recorded 
the highest turnout.’107 For a Kalenjin youth, the ‘ICC is present-day colonialism. [People] were 
not ready to be taken back by a white man. Nobody understood what ICC stands for.’108 These 
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sentiments show that attitudes were already formed before the election and affected people’s 
decisions. 
With conflicting and divergent Kikuyu/Kalenjin narratives and sceptical middle-class 
and other Kenyan voters, the Jubilee Alliance’s ne-colonial narrative presented a viable option 
for overcoming the ICC stigma. Against the backdrop of the ICC’s focus in Africa,109 the West’s 
visible support for the Court financially, logistically and in policy positions abroad,110 and 
Africa’s history of western domination (colonialism and slavery), neo-colonialism found new 
relevance with the ICC’s intervention in Kenya.    
Neo-colonialism presented a safe ‘space’ in which the Jubilee Alliance could maximize 
on opportunities for public vituperation of the Court while minimizing threats of antagonizing 
enemy (Kikuyu and Kalenjin) communities. As such, the narrative united a majority of sceptical 
Kikuyus and Kalenjins under the banner of victimhood at the hands of the ICC and a waning 
national sovereignty due to western interference. The Alliance invoked Kenya’s suffering 
under British colonialism as well as the struggle for independence under notable nationalists 
– the Kapenguria Six (Jomo Kenyatta, Achien’g Oneko, Kung’u Karumba, Fred Kubai, Bildad 
Kaggia and Paul Ngei) – who were likened to the Ocampo Six. The colonial powers 
incarcerated the six nationalists at a Kapenguria prison. As Tee Ngugi notes, ‘Kapenguria 
represented the struggle for independence and dignity of the Kenyan people,’ and the Ocampo 
Six ‘purported an equivalence between their circumstances and those of Kenyatta and his 
colleagues at Kapenguria.’111   
Of appeal to the Kikuyu was that the neo-colonial narrative was a reminder of the 
independence struggle that the Mau Mau (freedom fighters) staged under Jomo Kenyatta 
(Uhuru’s father) to fight British rule. Besides gross human rights violations under colonialism, 
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the Kikuyu’s fertile highlands were expropriated for white settlement and indigenous Africans 
were relocated to unproductive reserve lands. The neo-colonial narrative called upon the 
Kikuyu to resist the reincarnation of colonialism through the ICC – a mzungu112 court – which 
was targeting Kenyatta’s son in a new affront on Kenya’s sovereignty. A Kiambu resident 
observes that according to the people’s narratives, they fought off the colonialists and  
the ICC intervention was a reminder that we are still under western rule…Fighting 
the ICC amounted to fighting the mzungu as they did a long time ago and this is a 
reminder of colonialism, and has to be fought at all costs.113  
Similarly, the Kalenjin were appeased with the linking of Ruto’s tribulations to those of 
the famous leader of the Nandi rebellion – Koitalel arap Samoei, whom some even suggested 
hailed from Ruto’s Talai clan.114 A Kalenjin youth noted that ‘Kalenjins think the ICC is an 
extension of colonialism…and [is] manipulated by outside powers and interested partners in 
Kenya.’115  
Essentially, the Jubilee Alliance linked the ICC intervention to the re-emergence of the 
western domination of Africans (through targeting their leaders while ignoring other serious 
conflicts) and therefore the need for Kenyans to safeguard their sovereignty. In this regard, 
statements by western envoys were reframed as undue external interference in domestic 
affairs, and, by default, support of their main rival – Odinga. Specifically, the statement from 
the US assistant secretary of state116 was problematic given that the US is not a party to the 
Rome Statute, commits atrocities globally and was demanding Kenyans’ fidelity to the ICC. A 
CORD official notes that ‘the statement showed that unlike Jubilee, CORD had the goodwill of 
the international community and that progressive Kenyans would believe this to attract 
international investments and improve international relations.’117 He observes that the Jubilee 
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Alliance ‘used it [the statement] to entrench propaganda that Raila, CORD and the West 
wanted to take Ruto and Uhuru to the ICC.’118  
Consequently, the neo-colonial narrative resonated with a majority of the Jubilee 
Alliance’s domestic constituencies. Reflecting on the narrative’s effects on public perceptions, 
a Kalenjin youth remarked:  
Kenyans would easily understand it [the ICC] wasn’t here for a good 
assignment, but as other assignments to subject them to present-day 
colonization through a judicial process. Many people reacted by making 
them president and deputy president.119  
Likewise, according to Walter Menya, a journalist who followed the ICC discourses, 
‘The question this begs is, where does politics end and where does judicial process begin in 
this case?’120 In the same vein, a prominent civil society activist observes that ‘Jubilee’s neo-
colonial narrative made it difficult for the Court to project itself as balanced.’121 He claims that 
the framing of the 2013 election as a referendum on the ICC122 helped to mobilize the 
Alliance’s support base. Moreover, in February 2013, just before the elections, the KNDR 
monitoring report concluded that  
the debate has since become politicised and ethnicised…The image of the ICC 
has gradually shifted and impunity as a campaign theme has been clouded by 
allegations of political witch-hunts.123   
Notably, national support for the ICC remained high (at 66 percent) but low in the home 
regions of the accused.124 Thus, Kenyatta speaks of his election victory:  
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My government’s decisive election must be seen as a categorical rebuke by the 
people of Kenya of those who wished to interfere with our internal affairs and 
infringe our sovereignty.125 
 
<B>Gaining Concessions from ICC Sympathizers  
In attempts to overcome normative contestations, the Jubilee Alliance’s neo-colonial narrative 
gained some concessions from the Court’s support base. With support for the ICC being 
construed as pro-neo-colonialism, some ICC sympathizers embraced a more cautious 
approach in public discourses on the Court. First, after the backlash against their statements, 
western diplomats refrained from making bold pronouncements in support of the trials. The 
head of a Nairobi-based international NGO recounts her cautious approach to the Court: ‘If I 
am pro-ICC in the field, I can be seen as pro-West…I am careful not to be seen as a puppet 
of the West.’126   
Second, in the run-up to the 2013 elections, CORD also developed a more cautious 
approach to the ICC ‘because of the surge in portraying the [CORD] coalition as pushing for 
ICC prosecutions.’127 A former Odinga ally and party official remarks that ‘the ICC became his 
[Odinga’s] waterloo in the Rift Valley...Ruto had managed to mobilize the Kalenjin around the 
ICC and this occasioned his [Odinga’s] change of tune.’128 For example, during a campaign 
rally in Eldoret, Odinga promised to bring the Kenyan cases back home,129 further reinforcing 
the Jubilee Alliance’s views that the ICC trials were unwarranted and unnecessary disruptions 
in Kenya’s domestic affairs. On successive Ruto’s fixing debate that the Jubilee Alliance 
orchestrated to claim that the cases were based on a witch hunt and ought to be halted, CORD 
took a more pragmatic approach and also supported case termination.130 During the debates, 
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for example, some CORD MPs signed the Jubilee Alliance’s petitions to terminate the 
cases,131 and Odinga offered to testify in favour of Ruto.132  
Although CSOs were branded as ‘evil’ and as puppets of the West, they remained 
unbowed and continued national and international advocacy to support the ICC trials. 
Nonetheless, as Thomas Hansen and Chandra Sriram reveal, the narratives on CSOs as 
agents of imperialism undermined their pro-accountability message.133 As such, CSOs found 
themselves on the defensive and had difficulty in countering the narrative. Furthermore, with 
the Jubilee Alliance in power, they no longer felt they could push as actively for accountability, 
and especially for the ICC.134  
 
<B>Bringing ‘Africa in’ 
Given the ICC’s global stature, the neo-colonial narrative was also instrumental in courting 
regional solidarity in battling the Court. As a Jubilee Alliance activist explains, the Alliance 
could not confront the ICC on its own, despite forming the government, because ‘the ICC is a 
big giant, and hence the need to Africanize the problem and get the help of African leaders.’135 
Africanizing their ICC predicament was thus useful in consolidating regional support, which 
would be instrumental in demanding concessions from the Court. As John Heathershaw and 
Daniel Lambach contend, the regional community is an elite solidarity group that either 
facilitates or resists global governance.136 Specifically, the AU is a regional solidarity group 
that was created to resist colonial invasion on the African continent.137   
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With imminent trials at The Hague, the Jubilee administration influenced the convening 
of an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU in October 2013 in which Kenya’s ICC 
cases topped the agenda. In the session, Kenyatta made a moving speech on the African 
renaissance that was premised on the ICC’s intrusion into Africa at the behest of colonial 
powers. He implored for African solidarity:  
Kenya looks to her friends in time of need. We come to you to vindicate our 
independence and sovereignty…This is the forum for us to unite and categorically 
vindicate our sovereignty…I have utmost confidence that this Assembly’s voice 
will be clear to the entire world.138  
In rebuking the ICC, Kenyatta argued,  
The ICC stopped being the home of justice for the fact that all the cases currently 
before it arise from Africa, yet Africa is not the only continent where international 
crimes are being committed.139  
Heeding Kenya’s solidarity calls, the AU arrived at non-cooperation policy decisions on 
Kenya’s ICC charges. Among the decisions was that ‘President Uhuru Kenyatta will not appear 
before the ICC’140 until the UNSC and the ICC address the AU’s concerns. The AU also 
decided that cases on Kenyan leaders ‘should be suspended until they complete their terms 
of office.’141 Besides, the Assembly reaffirmed earlier decisions on Sudan and decided that  
to safeguard the constitutional order, stability and, integrity of Member States, no 
charges shall be commenced or continued before any International Court or 
Tribunal against any serving AU Head of State.142   
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Though the AU policy positions were unsuccessful in terminating the cases, regional 
solidarity helped to moderate the ICC’s dealings in respect of the Kenyan charges. As Walter 
Menya reveals,  
The AU summit was making the ICC restless…the ICC registrar appealed to Africa 
not to take any drastic measures…and hold onto any issues they may have 
against the court or the conduct of the proceedings until the Assembly of State 
Parties (ASP) set for next month [November] rather than at the summit.143 
Further, at an ASP meeting in 2013, the AU succeeded in pushing through amendments 
to the Statute’s rules of procedure and evidence to allow Kenyatta and Ruto to be excused 
from continuous appearance at the Court due to their state responsibilities.144 The AU’s joint 
front also enabled them to effectively resist the OTP’s attempts to use the amended Rule 68, 
which allowed admission of recanted evidence in cases of witness interference, in Ruto and 
Sang’s case.145   
Moreover, the AU heads of state adopted Kenya’s proposal to exit the ICC. However, a 
Jubilee Alliance insider reveals that ‘some things are done for the moment and Kenya does 
not want to exit the ICC.’146 He believes the recent AU posturing around Africa withdrawing 
was more about influencing decisions. As such, despite a commanding majority in the National 
Assembly and control of government, the Jubilee Alliance has not taken active steps to 
withdraw from the ICC despite its perceived neo-colonial agenda. Probed on withdrawal, 
Kenya’s foreign affairs minister claimed that ‘Kenya is not keen on leaving the ICC, but 
reforming it.’147 Similarly, Kenyatta has on numerous occasions called for the ICC’s reform.148  
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After a mistrial ruling on the Sang and Ruto case and the final collapse of all the Ocampo 
Six cases, Kenyatta thanked the AU for ‘standing in solidarity with Kenya as the country battled 
the ICC cases facing its citizens.’149 In the same vein, the chairman of the Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Committee in parliament, Ndung’u Gethenji, remarked that ‘Kenyatta celebrated the 
2013 election as a moment where the Kenyan people had stood up to foreign interference, 
rekindled the Pan-African spirit and reconceptualised African solidarity.’150 In his view, 
Kenyatta’s approach paid dividends in the face of the worries that the ICC cases presented, 
such as international isolation.151 Gethenji concludes that under similar circumstances, ‘Most 
African presidents getting into power would have grovelled at the feet of the international 
community and begged to be accepted into the community of world leaders.’152 
 
<A>CONCLUSION 
The Jubilee Alliance’s struggle for and against cooperation eventually succeeded in managing 
commitment risks as well as noncompliance risks. The ICC terminated the cases on the 
grounds of non-cooperation, which the OTP attributed to the government’s reluctance to turn 
in crucial evidence and threats to some witnesses, some of who later withdrew from the 
cases.153 On the other hand, the Alliance’s compliance with Court summonses and the 
eventual termination of their cases lent credence to their narratives of innocence, adherence 
to international norms and denial that they were fugitives of justice.154  
More importantly, the Jubilee Alliance recast the ICC’s intervention as neo-colonial, 
which was instrumental in Kenyatta and Ruto overcoming the ICC stigma and associated 
obstacles in their quest for the country’s leadership, as well as in their dealings with the Court 
afterwards. The narrative had several impacts, such as persuading domestic constituencies 
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while delegitimizing the ICC, gaining concessions from the Court’s supporters and pursuing 
regional solidarity in battling the ICC.  
Furthermore, the ICC’s ‘detachment from domestic constituencies and partial deviation 
from domestic traditions and legal structures’155 enabled local actors to maximize their agency 
vis-à-vis the ICC. The Jubilee Alliance’s ability to counter-shame the ICC was partly due to 
the Court’s reliance on shaming and soft power to encourage cooperation, as well as the local 
historical and political contexts that political actors exploited. Although strong states such as 
the US and Israel can use their financial, military and economic power to orchestrate non-
cooperation, local actors in weaker states can leverage domestic historical and normative 
traditions to orchestrate non-cooperation. As this article has shown, this non-cooperation 
might not be outright defiance as in Sudan’s case. Rather, as the Kenyan case illustrates, non-
cooperation may be subtler and more nuanced. 
Nonetheless, the Jubilee Alliance’s ability to counter-shame the ICC raises 
fundamental questions, given the inextricable link between ICJ and transitional justice 
practice.156 For example, how does counter-shaming the ICC feed into other transitional justice 
frameworks that post-conflict societies use to redress the past?   
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